INFORMATION BRIEF
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Research Department
600 State Office Building
St. Paul, MN 55155

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Joel Michael, Legislative Analyst
651-296-5057

The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act

The Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act (UCSA) requires cigarettes to be sold at minimum prices. The act has the effect of raising cigarette prices and increasing the margins of wholesalers and retailers. This information brief describes how the Minnesota UCSA works, the laws in other states, and the likely economic effects of the UCSA. An appendix also describes the law, enacted in 2000, that requires UCSA prices to be used for certain gray market cigarettes.

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Overview

How the Act Works. The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act (UCSA) prohibits wholesalers and retailers from selling cigarettes "below cost." The act establishes a presumption that wholesalers' costs are 4.5 percent of invoice prices and that retailers' costs are 8 percent of the invoice prices. In combination, the act presumes a 12.9 percent total mark-up. Wholesalers and retailers may use lower mark-ups, if they can prove their actual selling costs are lower. However, wholesalers must file with the Department of Revenue (DOR) before doing so. Few wholesalers do so and, by most accounts, retailers generally charge the statutory mark-ups.

Administrative Responsibilities under the Act. DOR is responsible for administering and enforcing the UCSA. The costs of administration are offset by fees charged to cigarette wholesalers.

Minimum Cigarette Pricing Laws in Other States. Nearly half of the other states (24) have similar laws, although most of these states (15) have lower percentage mark-ups. Seven states have general fair trade laws, but no separate law for cigarettes. A substantial number of states (18) do not regulate cigarette prices.

Purpose of the law. The stated purpose of the act is to prevent unfair competition from sales below cost. In practice, it restricts common sales techniques and much price competition. The act has been supported by anti-smoking advocates because it raises the price of cigarettes.

Economic Effects of the UCSA. Based on standard principles of microeconomic theory, the UCSA likely:

- Raises cigarette prices
- Reduces Minnesota sales of cigarettes
- Increases the profits of wholesalers and retailers of cigarettes, particularly smaller sellers with higher cost structures
- Is regressive, since it redistributes income from smokers to owners of wholesale and retail outlets
- Magnifies or increases the burden of federal and state cigarette excise taxes on consumers, since the statutory percentage mark-ups are based on amounts that include the excise taxes
- Has increased the cost to smokers of the legal settlements of state-filed lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers, since these settlements are generally paid by increased cigarette prices which are subject to the act's percentage mark-ups

The Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act

How the Act Works

The Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act is a “fair trade” law that sets minimum permissible prices for wholesale and retail sales of cigarettes. The purpose of the act, according to its terms, is to prevent wholesalers and retailers from selling cigarettes below cost and, thus, to “have the intent or effect of injuring a competitor, destroying or lessening competition[.]”[1] Selling below cost, according to the act’s purpose statement, is “an unfair and deceptive business practice” and “an unfair method of competition.”[2]

Minimum prices of cigarettes under the act are determined under a series of percentage mark-ups of manufacturers’ or wholesalers’ prices.

The act specifies the minimum prices for cigarettes under a series of percentage mark-ups. The following chart shows how the calculations are made. These percentages are presumptions; a retailer or wholesaler may deviate from them if its actual costs are lower. However, a wholesaler must pre-file documentation with DOR before charging based on lower actual costs.[3] Retailers are not required to pre-file, but the act provides that actual costs are determined by cost surveys.[4] These procedures are discussed in more detail below.

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[1] Minn. Stat. § 325D.30 (1998).

[2] *Id.*

[3] *See* Minn. Stat. § 325D.32, subd. 10(c) (1998).

[4] Minn. Stat. § 325D.38, subd. 2 (1998).

Calculation of Minimum Cigarette Sale Prices

manufacturer's gross invoice price (excluding manufacturer's discounts for timely payment and stamping)		
+		
excise tax		
=		
basic cost of cigarettes		
+		
4% mark-up	or	wholesaler's actual cost of doing business (documentation substantiating this must be filed with DOR)
+		
0.5% mark-up	or	actual cartage costs, if paid by wholesaler
=		
minimum wholesale price		
+		
8% of gross invoice cost to retailer	or	retailer's actual cost of doing business
=		
minimum retail price		

The net result (if wholesaler and retailer charge the presumed percentage mark-ups) is that minimum retail price equals 12.9 percent of the sum of the manufacturer's invoice price and federal and state excise taxes. The minimum mark-up does not equal the sum of the wholesalers' and retailers' mark-ups, since they must be multiplied by each other.[5] Also, if the cigarettes were

[5] Expressing it algebraically, if p is the manufacturer's price and t is the federal and state excise taxes, the wholesaler's minimum price equals $(p + t) + 0.045(p + t)$ or $1.045(p + t)$. The retailer's mark-up, then, applies to this amount. The retail price equals $1.045(p + t) + 0.8(1.045(p + t))$ or $1.129(p + t)$. Thus, the total presumed mark-up equals 12.9 percent.

purchased in distressed sale type circumstances (e.g., bankruptcy, forced sales, and other sales outside of the ordinary channels of trade), retailers and wholesalers may not use invoice prices in these computations.[6]

The act addresses special situations by exempting some sales of cigarettes and by subjecting other commodities to minimum pricing, if they are sold in combination with cigarettes.

The act exempts:

- Isolated sales
- A *bona fid*e sale to close out a business of selling cigarettes
- Sales of defective, imperfect, or damaged cigarettes[7]

If dealers sell cigarettes at a combined price with another good or service, the minimum pricing rules then apply to other commodities and these commodities cannot be sold below actual cost.[8] This is intended to prevent tying of cigarettes with another commodity to effectively avoid the minimum pricing rules. Thus, dealers cannot sell a combination of cigarettes and some other product as a "loss leader."

Retailers and wholesalers may use actual costs instead of the statutory percentages; this is, apparently, rarely done.

As indicated in the flow chart, the act authorizes wholesalers and retailers to use their actual costs, rather than the presumed statutory mark-ups. However, the act imposes barriers to doing so.

For a wholesaler to use this actual cost option, it must submit to the Commissioner of Revenue "documentation substantiating the actual cost of the cigarettes *before* selling at actual cost."[9] The wholesaler may only begin selling at actual cost, if 15 days have passed and the Commissioner of Revenue has not requested additional documentation. New documentation must be filed each year, if the wholesaler wishes to continue using the actual cost option. Furthermore, any time the basic cost of cigarettes to the wholesaler increases, new documentation must be re-filed. The basic cost of cigarettes changes whenever one of three events occur:

- the manufacturer increases prices
- the federal excise tax increases
- the state excise tax increases

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[6] Minn. Stat. § 325D.39 (1998).

[7] Minn. Stat. § 325D.36 (1998).

[8] Minn. Stat. § 325D.34 (1998).

[9] Minn. Stat. § 325D.32, subd. 10(c) (1998) [Emphasis added].

Excise tax increases are sporadically enacted. But manufacturers have tended, in recent years, to regularly increase prices. For example, manufacturers increased prices twice in calendar year 1998 and once in calendar year 1999.[10] Each of these would require a wholesaler seeking to use the actual cost option to file new documentation and wait (at least) 15 days to implement the actual cost-based pricing for the cigarettes on which the manufacturer increased prices.[11]

The law is not exactly clear what elements must be taken into account in determining a wholesaler's actual costs. Recognized statistical and cost accounting must be used. The statute contains a list of costs including:

> without limitation, labor, rent, depreciation, sales costs, compensation, maintenance of equipment, cartage, licenses, taxes, insurance, or other expenses.[12]

Filing to use actual costs may also subject the wholesaler's proprietary information on costs and pricing strategies to disclosure to its competitors. Information filed under the UCSA is generally public information under the Government Data Practices Act.[13] A district court has held that certain cost and pricing information qualify as a "trade secret" and are not subject to public disclosure.[14]

According to DOR, over the years, only a handful of wholesalers typically file with DOR to use actual pricing information. At the present time, only one wholesaler has filed to use actual costs. (The pending dispute over whether this filing information is subject to public disclosure has likely affected the willingness to file.) However, in response to the one filing, 38 other wholesalers have filed to meet the prices of the one wholesaler that did file.

Retailers are not required to pre-file documentation in using actual cost pricing.[15] They are,

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[10] This is based on filings with DOR. The major manufacturers tend to increase their prices together. For example, filings were made by on August 27, 1999, by Philip Morris U.S.A., R. J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson Tobacco, and Lorillard Tobacco Company, and three days later on August 30, 1999, by Liggett Group Inc. All of the increases (except for speciality brands) were for an identical amount of $9 per thousand. A similar pattern prevailed for the other increases.

[11] Minn. Stat. § 325D.32, subd. 10(c) (1998).

[12] Minn. Stat. § 325D.38, subd. 2 (1998).

[13] Minn. Stat. ch. 13.

[14] *Supervalu v. Smith*, Ramsey County Dist. Ct., No. 62-C9-99-010390 (Aug. 24, 2000). The period for appeal of this decision remains open. The court decision effectively reverses an advisory opinion issued by the Commissioner of Administration that under the circumstances involved in *Supervalu*, the information was not a non-public trade secret. Minn. Dept. of Administration, Advisory Opinion 99-035 (Oct. 26, 1999).

[15] *Compare* Minn. Stat. § 325D.32, subd. 10(c) (1998) *with* Minn. Stat. § 325D.32, subd. 11(1998) (wholesalers' statute includes filing requirement, while retailers' statute does not).

however, subject to the same rules of proof of actual costs that apply to wholesalers. Thus, charging less than the percentage mark-ups subjects a retailer to the threat of civil liability, if the retailer is unable to prove under the act's standards that its actual costs justified the lower mark-up.

Wholesalers and retailers may lower their prices to meet the price of a competitor, but only if the lower price is a legal price.[16] This authority cannot be used to lower prices to those of cigarettes that are exempt from the act's restrictions (e.g., business liquidation sales and sales of defective products). Wholesalers are required to file a written notice of their intent to meet a competitor's price with the Commissioner of Revenue.[17] The wholesaler cannot lower its price if the Commissioner of Revenue notifies the wholesaler that the price was not a legal price. For a retailer to use this authority to meet a lower price, a survey apparently must be done to determine if the price is a legal price. This survey would document lowest costs for the trading area.[18]

Administrative Responsibilities under the Act

The Department of Revenue administers the act; the cost of administration is indirectly paid by cigarette wholesalers.

Various state agencies have been responsible for administering the UCSA since its enactment in 1961.[19] DOR now administers the act, a duty which it has carried out since 1979.[20] A natural question is why a tax administrative agency is charged with administering and enforcing a fair

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[16] Minn. Stat. § 325D.37 (1998).

[17] Minn. Stat. § 325D.37, subd. 3 (1998).

[18] Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.37; 325D.38 (1998).

[19] The original act charged the Department of Business Development (now Trade and Economic Development) with administrative responsibility for the act. 1961 Laws, spec. sess., ch. 35, § 13, codified at Minn. Stat. § 326.76 (1961). The 1967 Legislature transferred a number of the duties of that department to the attorney general. 1967 Laws, ch. 302, §§ 1, 2. The legislature also modified the UCSA, including the administrative responsibilities. 1967 Laws, ch. 600, § 12. The effect of the reassignment of responsibilities to the attorney general was apparently construed to include the responsibility for the UCSA. *See* Minn. Stat. § 325.77 (1967) (codifying the two laws as transferring the duties to the attorney general). In 1969, administrative responsibility was transferred to the Commissioner of Taxation. 1969 Laws, ch. 759, §§ 4, 5. In 1973, administrative authority was transferred yet again, to the commerce commission and its chair. 1973 Laws, ch. 607, §§ 3 - 6. The 1978 Legislature did not transfer the administrative authority, but simply repealed the commerce commission's duties. 1978 Laws, ch. 793, § 98. This effectively left the act as self-enforcing or by private actions. After a one-year hiatus in 1979, the legislature required the Commissioner of Revenue to administer and enforce the provisions of the act. 1979 Laws, ch. 303, art. 10, § 4.

[20] The statutory language of the UCSA simply refers to "the commissioner." It does not define or specify which commissioner is referred to. The statutory section specifying the Commissioner of Revenue's powers directs the commissioner to administer and enforce the act. Minn. Stat. § 270.06(20).

trade law.[21] One possible answer is that the legislature considered the department's expertise in administering the excise taxes on cigarettes and its ongoing relationships with cigarette wholesalers that pay the excise taxes. This expertise and knowledge of the industry may have been thought to make DOR the most efficient and effective state agency to administer the law.

Mandatory administrative responsibilities. The act requires the department to:

- Review and (implicitly) substantiate the accuracy of submissions by wholesalers seeking to charge lower mark-ups than the statute's presumption[22]

- Inform wholesalers who seek to meet prices of competitors whether the price is a legal price[23]

- Regularly publish presumed legal prices in the State Register[24]

- Collect the distributor fees[25]

Other powers. The act gives the department authority in administering the act to:

- Deny a distributor or subjobber a license to sell cigarettes for violations of the act[26]

- Revoke a distributor's or subjobber's authority to apply tax stamps to cigarettes following an administrative proceeding[27]

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[21] Administration of a fair trade law and, in particular, its application to retailers and others who are not cigarette excise taxpayers would not seem to be a natural responsibility for DOR. The department's primary responsibilities are administration and collection of taxes, as well as payment of state aid to local governments. *See* Minn. Stat. § 270.06 (1998). By contrast, administration of the most of the laws regulating trade practices is in the Department of Commerce (insurance, financial institutions, and securities) or the Office of Attorney General (general trade practice laws). *See, e.g.*, Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (assigning administrative responsibilities for various trade practice laws to the attorney general).

[22] Minn. Stat. § 325D.32, subd. 10(c) (1998).

[23] Minn. Stat. § 325D.37 (1998).

[24] Minn. Stat. § 325D.371 (1998). These prices will need to be published each time the basic cost of cigarettes changes. This occurs when the manufacturer raises prices or when the federal or state excise tax increases. The law requires the prices to be published at least every ten months, even if one of these events does not occur.

[25] Minn. Stat. § 325D.415 (1998).

[26] Minn. Stat. § 325D.33, subd. 5 (1998).

[27] Minn. Stat. § 325D.33, subd. 6 (1998).

- Impose and collect administrative penalties for violations of the act[28]

- Conduct investigations to determine compliance with the act[29]

The law imposes fees on cigarette distributors to recoup the cost of administering the act. These fees equal $2,500 per year for a distributor with more than $2 million in cigarette tax collections and $1,200 for all other distributors. In fiscal year 1998, these fees generated $91,800 and $123,500 in fiscal year 1999. These fees are deposited in the general fund. Although they are imposed to recover the cost of administering the act, they do not automatically go to DOR. As part of the process of developing a budget, the legislature appropriates money for the function of administering the act based on the legislature's determination of the appropriate expenditures for that function. In any given year, this may not equal the revenue yield from the distributor's fee.

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[28] Minn. Stat. § 325D.33, subd. 8 (1998).

[29] Minn. Stat. § 325D.405 (1998).

Minimum Cigarette Pricing Laws in Other States

Including Minnesota, 25 states have laws prohibiting the sale of cigarettes below cost or requiring sales at a minimum price. Seven states (California, Colorado, Michigan, North Dakota, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have general fair trade laws that prohibit sale of cigarettes (along with other goods) below the seller's cost. The District of Columbia prohibits secret discounts or payments in the sales of cigarettes that are not generally available to all sellers. In 18 states, cigarette prices are determined by free market forces. The map displays which states have minimum pricing laws, general fair trade laws, or do not regulate cigarette prices.



Some of the details of these laws are set forth in the table below. As can be seen from the table, Minnesota's presumed minimum price is among the higher of the states with these laws. A few states have higher minimum price presumptions than Minnesota (e.g., Massachusetts, Connecticut, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Maryland). South Dakota and Indiana have the same presumed minimum price as Minnesota. Other states have lower presumptions, some of them quite a bit lower.

Three bordering states, Iowa, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, have minimum cigarette pricing laws. Minnesota's other border state, North Dakota, does not have a minimum pricing law, but a general trade practices law applies.

State Statutes Requiring Minimum Pricing of Cigarettes

State	Minimum Mark-up*			Penalties**
	Wholesale	Retail	Total	
Arkansas	2.75%	6.00%	8.92%	$500 fine; injunctive relief; revoke/suspend license
California	General unfair trade practices law			
Connecticut	6.50%	8.00%	15.02%	
Colorado	General unfair trade practices law			
Delaware	5.00%	None	5.00%	$1,000 for first offense, $5,000 for subsequent; injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
District of Columbia	Prohibits secret payments and discounts			Injunctive relief; treble damages; suspend/revoke license
Idaho	2.00%	6.00%	8.12%	Misdemeanor $500 fine, 6 months
Indiana	4.50%	8.00%	12.86%	Injunctive relief
Iowa	3.00%	6.00%	9.18%	Misdemeanor; injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
Kentucky	2.75%	8.00%	10.97%	$1,000 fine; injunctive relief
Louisiana	2.00%	6.00%	8.12%	Suspend permit
Maine	2.00%	6.00%	8.12%	Injunctive relief, treble damages
Maryland	5.00%	8.00%	13.40%	Injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
Massachusetts	2.75%	25.00%	28.44%	$500 fine
Michigan	General unfair trade practices law			
Minnesota	4.50%	8.00%	12.86%	Treble damages; injunctive relief
Mississippi	2.00%	6.00%	8.12%	$500 fine; injunctive relief
Montana	5.75%	10.00%	16.33%	$500 fine; injunctive relief
Nebraska	4.75%	8.00%	13.13%	Class V misdemeanor; suspend/revoke license; injunctive relief
Nevada	Wholesalers may not sell below cost			$50 fine per violation

State Statutes Requiring Minimum Pricing of Cigarettes (cont.)

State	Minimum Mark-up*			Penalties**
	Wholesale	Retail	Total	
New Jersey	6.00%	8.00%	14.48%	$1,000 fine; injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
New York	May not sell below cost			Injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
North Dakota	General unfair trade practices law			
Ohio	2.00%	6.00%	8.12%	Suspend/revoke license
Oklahoma	2.75%	6.00%	8.92%	$500 fine; injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
Pennsylvania	4.00%	6.00%	10.24%	Agency discretion
Rhode Island	May not sell below cost			Suspend/revoke permit
South Carolina	General unfair trade practices law			
South Dakota	4.50%	8.00%	12.86%	Injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
Tennessee	none	8.00%	8.00%	$250 first violation, $500, second, $1,000, subsequent; injunctive relief; suspend/revoke license
West Virginia	General unfair trade practice law			
Wisconsin	3.00%	6.00%	9.18%	Injunctive relief, treble damages
Wyoming	General unfair trade practice law			

* In most states the minimum mark-up is a presumption and applies against the “basic cost of cigarettes.” This is usually defined as the lower of the invoice amount or the cost of replacement. Since the mark-up is a presumption, the wholesaler or retailer may sell at a lower price, if it files sufficient evidence that its actual costs are lower than the presumption.

** Penalties in addition to the presumed availability of compensatory monetary damages.

The Purpose of the Law

Two purposes are commonly cited for the UCSA:

- **Protecting wholesale and retail cigarette sellers from "unfair" competition**
- **Reducing smoking**

Protecting cigarette sellers. The UCSA explicitly states its purpose is to prevent "injuring a competitor, destroying or lessening competition" through "unfair competition[.]"[30] In operation, the law does not encourage competition, but rather protects the margins and profits of some cigarette sellers. The law restricts competition by prohibiting standard sales techniques used in the retail and wholesale businesses. Normal competition in the retail marketplace almost inherently "injures" competitors by capturing sales that the other sellers would make.

The law does not prohibit competition *per se*, but restricts it to specific types of competition. In practice, it appears to have two effects:

- **The act restricts techniques typically used by new entrants and businesses attempting aggressively to increase their market shares through price competition.** Two standard competitive techniques—"loss leaders" to attract customers to a store and temporary sales at a loss to attract market share—are prohibited by the act. Both the techniques are most commonly used by new businesses or by businesses that are seeking to expand their market shares. Thus, the law appears intended to protect existing sellers from these standard practices of new entrants and sellers aggressively attempting to increase their market share through price competition.[31]

- **Low-cost sellers are disadvantaged.** By creating a presumption that the sales below statutory percentage mark-ups are "below cost" and in violation of the law, the act burdens low-cost sellers. These sellers can sell below these statutory presumption, if they can prove their costs are lower. But the law imposes burdens on them to do so. For wholesalers, this is a bureaucratic and procedural burden. They must file proof with DOR before charging lower than the statutory percentages. This increases their costs, imposes delays, and potentially subjects cost information to public scrutiny, as well as making it difficult to use this option. Retailers are not subject to these bureaucratic requirements, but may still be deterred from selling below the statutory presumptions. Doing so subjects them to potential lawsuits by competitors and state enforcement actions in which they would be required to prove (under uncertain standards) that they were not selling below cost.

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[30] Minn. Stat. § 325D.30 (1998).

[31] One can observe that if these standards were applied across all markets that most of the sales practices of the consumer-oriented e-commerce sector would have been illegal.

Thus, the act appears designed mainly to protect sellers of cigarettes with higher cost structures from price competition from new entrants and sellers with low-cost structures (e.g., large discount operations). The laws main beneficiaries are convenience stores, small grocery stores, and other smaller sellers of cigarettes. The milk price regulation law[32] is the only other Minnesota law that requires minimum prices.[33] The milk price laws is generally thought to serve income distribution effects—i.e., by most accounts, it is intended to raise the incomes of dairy farmers. The purpose of the UCSA appears to be similar, i.e., to redistribute income to small cigarette sellers with high-cost structures. Testimony before the legislature in opposition to proposals to repeal or limit the UCSA generally tends to bear this out; the focus of the opposition has come from owners of convenience and other small stores that make significant cigarette sales.

Reducing smoking. Although not reflected in the act's purpose statement, during legislative debates the law has been supported on the basis that it raises cigarette prices and, thereby, reduces smoking. Since studies show that cigarette sales decline with increases in prices and since the act has the effect of increasing cigarette prices, it likely does reduce smoking.[34] This is likely an unintended side effect of the law; its principal purpose is to protect high-cost, small sellers of cigarettes. More direct ways to use government programs to reduce smoking would include anti-smoking campaigns or raising the excise tax.[35]

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[32] Minn. Stat. §§ 32.70 - 32.745 (1998). This law prohibits selling below the amount the wholesaler or retailer paid for the product. Minn. Stat. §§ 32.70, subd 2; 32.72 (1998). The law does not require selling costs to be included in the price, as the UCSA does. One could argue that the minimum wage law imposes a minimum price regulation (i.e., wages are a price for work). It is clear that the minimum wage is intended to serve income distribution purposes—i.e., to help raise the incomes of low-wage workers.

[33] The restraint of trade law prohibits selling below cost, but it also requires having a purpose of "injuring a competitor or destroying competition" before such a sale is illegal. Minn. Stat. § 325D.04 (1998). This purpose requirement effectively allows selling below cost to establish market share, as a loss leader to attract customers to a store, and other common techniques used by retailers and wholesalers.

[34] See the discussion in the text below on the elasticity of cigarette purchases and a guess as to the effect of the act on amount of cigarette purchases in note 40.

[35] An excise tax increase would be more a uniform mechanism for raising cigarette prices than the UCSA which affects sellers differentially depending upon their cost structures. It would also permit the revenue to be rebated to low-income individuals to offset the regressivity of the excise tax. This could be done through an existing mechanism, such as the working family (earned income) credit or the property tax refund.

Economic Effects of the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act

The UCSA has several likely overall or general economic effects. It:

- **Raises cigarette prices**
- **Reduces Minnesota sales of cigarettes**
- **Increases the profits of wholesalers and retailers of cigarettes**
- **Is regressive, redistributing income from smokers to owners of wholesale and retail outlets**

The UCSA, in effect, sets minimum prices which may be charged to purchasers of cigarettes. These minimum price requirements deviate from prices that otherwise would be set by the private market. This type of price regulation is an unusual form of government intervention in the private market. Most prices are determined by factors of supply and demand. The government regulates prices in a few circumstances. Most of these involve cases in which it is believed that the forces of private competition will not set appropriate prices because of market failure. In almost all cases, these government regulations involve setting *maximum* prices, such as price regulations of public utility rates.[36] These situations involve instances where the regulation reduces the cost to consumers of the good or service. By contrast, the UCSA involves a situation where a *minimum* price is mandated. Thus, the UCSA has the opposite effect; it increases the prices that cigarettes smokers pay, all others things being equal.

The UCSA has some important economic effects. Some of these potential effects are suggested in the bulleted items below. This analysis is based on standard microeconomic principles and assumes that the market for retailing and wholesaling cigarettes is a perfectly competitive market.[37] The assertions are not based on empirical research and actual effects may differ, but economic theory suggests that these basic relationships are likely to hold.[38]

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[36] The purpose of these regulations of maximum prices is to prevent firms from setting prices that would earn "monopoly profits." These interventions in the market are generally justified by concerns of efficiency (e.g., without regulation of maximum prices, consumers' preferences for utility services would be under-served; too little electricity or gas would be purchased and we'd all be worse off as a result) or income distribution (e.g., poor people would have to pay too much of their incomes for utility services).

[37] Even if the market is not perfectly competitive, the results are likely to be about the same. The assumption that these markets are or are close to being perfectly competitive seems reasonable. On the retail side especially, there are a large number of sellers, none of whom have a dominant share. Furthermore, there is relative ease of entry for both wholesalers and retailers (e.g., capital and information requirements are low). The business of manufacturing cigarettes appears, by contrast, to be an oligopoly. Evidence for this includes: the small number of firms, the large capital requirements, and the lockstep pricing patterns by the industry. This fact may raise a question as to whether state minimum pricing laws tend to divert profits from the manufacturers to wholesalers and retailers, if their requirements (and effects on the quantity purchased) enter into the oligopoly's pricing decisions. This potential effect is ignored in the text.

[38] The author is unaware of any empirical economic research on the effect of minimum cigarette pricing laws. Research has been done on the effects of cigarette excise taxes and, as noted later in the text, special excise taxes are fairly similar policy instruments to the UCSA. The main differences between the two are: (1) the

- **Retail and wholesale prices of cigarettes will be higher.** Consumers pay more for cigarettes than they otherwise would. This follows naturally from the legal requirement of a minimum price requirement.

- **Fewer cigarettes will be sold in Minnesota.** This flows from the first point, that the act increases cigarette prices. A standard economic principle is the downward sloping demand curve: As prices increase, the quantity of the good or service consumed declines. Because of the addictive nature of tobacco, the demand for cigarettes has traditionally be thought to be relatively inelastic (i.e., not very responsive to price). However, the demand is not completely inelastic; the quantity purchased does drop with price increases.[39] Thus, the increase in price mandated by the act will decrease cigarette consumption. A reasonable guess might be that the act reduces consumption by 2 percent.[40]

- **The act generally will increase the profits of retailers and wholesalers of cigarettes.** These range from convenience stores and grocery stores to cigarette distributors. Of course, not all competitors will be affected equally. Sellers with lower cost structures will lose some of their advantages. For example, smokers may be more likely to purchase individual packs from a convenience store, rather than being sure to purchase larger quantities (e.g., cartons or multiple cartons) from a discounter, such as a large grocery store or discount club. The act will narrow or may even eliminate the price difference between these different types of retailers. As a result, these lower cost retailers will make larger profit margins on their sales, but will make fewer sales. The net result probably is lower total profits for these low-cost sellers.

- **The UCSA likely will redistribute income from lower to higher income individuals.** This point follows from the fact that the act increases the price of

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revenue from the excise tax is retained by the government, rather than going to the firms engaged in the cigarette trade, and (2) excise taxes are imposed at a uniform rate, while the effect of the minimum pricing laws will vary from seller to seller depending upon how much the price they would charge differs from the law's required minimum.

[39] Standard estimates of the overall elasticity ranges from -0.3 to -0.5. *See* U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, *Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of the Surgeon General* 322-37 (2000) (summarizing the empirical studies). Studies summarized in the Surgeon General's Report show elasticities ranging from -0.14 to -1.12. Most of the elasticities center around -0.4. An elasticity measures the change in consumption for a 1 percent change in price. Thus, an elasticity of -0.4 implies that a 1 percent increase in the price of cigarettes would result in a drop in consumption of 0.4 percent.

[40] This guess is based on an assumption that the UCSA results in a 5 percent increase in overall cigarette prices (i.e., slightly less than one-half of the mandated statutory mark-up) and that the price elasticity is -0.4 percent. The elasticity is the mid-point of the range of elasticities summarized in the Surgeon General's Report. See note 39. It should be noted that DOR traditionally has used a much lower elasticity of -0.1 or -0.2 in preparing revenue estimates for excise tax increases. The effect of the act on average mark-ups is only a guess. Given the relatively thin margins in the grocery business and testimony by convenience store owners that cigarettes provide a large share of their profits, it seems plausible and, perhaps, may be on the low side.

cigarettes, while increasing the profits of retailers and wholesalers. The price increase is distributed regressively. Cigarettes are not normal goods; the amount individuals spend on them does not increase with income. Cigarettes purchased constitute a larger share of the incomes of low-income smokers. By contrast, the profits of retailers and wholesalers tend to go to more affluent individuals.[41] In this sense, it is fair to think of the effects of the act as similar to a state-imposed excise tax, the revenues from which are mainly distributed to owners of retail and wholesale stores that sell cigarettes. The overall effect is likely to make the income distribution more regressive.

- **The act creates an incentive to purchase cigarettes at locations outside its jurisdiction.** Because of its price effects, the act creates an incentive for smokers to seek ways to avoid its effects. This can be done by making purchases at Indian reservations or in neighboring states (e.g., North Dakota) where similar laws do not apply. This effect of diverting purchases has been a widely recognized effect of state excise taxes.[42] The act, to the extent that minimum pricing does not apply at other locations, has a similar effect. Thus, the incentive to make purchases on Indian reservations or in other states may increase somewhat.

The UCSA magnifies the effect of state and federal excise tax increases.

Aside from the general economic effects of the UCSA, it interacts with the state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes. The minimum mark-ups under the act are calculated from the "basic cost of cigarettes." This amount is the combination of the manufacturer's price *plus* the state and federal excise taxes. As a result, when the state increases the excise tax, this automatically requires an increase in retail and wholesale prices equal to not just the amount of the excise tax, but also the minimum mark-up under the UCSA. As described above, Minnesota's minimum mark-up equals 12.9 percent. Thus, if the federal or state government were to increase the excise tax by 10 cents per pack, the act would require the retail price to rise by 11 cents per pack. Absent the act's requirements, one would expect that the price increase from an excise tax would

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[41] A small part of the increased revenue to retailers and wholesalers probably goes to employees and other suppliers of those firms, rather than to profits. This assumes that (1) the part of the return on the higher productivity of workers in lower cost retailers and wholesalers goes to the firm's owners, rather than the workers, and (2) more wages are paid to workers for retailers and wholesalers because the act redistributes more sales to higher cost retailers. In essence, the act results in more workers and employees being employed by retailers and wholesalers of cigarettes.

[42] *See, e.g.*, Jerry G. Thursby and Marie C. Thursby, "Interstate Cigarette Bootlegging: Extent, Revenue Losses, and Effects of Federal Intervention," 53 Nat. Tax J. 59 (2000); Patrick Fleenor, "How Excise Tax Differentials Affect Interstate Smuggling and Cross-Border Sales of Cigarettes in the United States," Tax Foundation (Oct. 1998).

be limited to the amount of the tax. Instead, actual price effects are larger. This apparently occurs and is observable in national data.[43]

This effect could be eliminated by changing the law to base the percentage mark-ups on the manufacturer's invoice prices, excluding federal and state excise taxes. The percentage presumptions could be adjusted to prevent this from having an immediate effect on the minimum presumptions under the act.

Similarly, the UCSA magnifies the effect of manufacturer's price increases.

Manufacturer's price increases have the same effects as excise tax increases; they automatically result in larger wholesale and retail mark-ups in absolute dollar terms. Thus, when the industry increased prices to pay for settlement of lawsuits filed by the states, these increases were automatically marked up by sellers who do not base their mark-ups on actual costs. Since the price hikes to pay for the state settlements were large (exceeding a dollar per pack), the UCSA essentially added a dime or more to the cost of the settlement to smokers. This, of course, benefitted wholesalers and retailers and offset their declining profits resulting from the reduced sales caused by the higher prices.

[43] Various studies have observed this effect and suggested various theories for it. *See, e.g.*, Jeffrey E. Harris, "The 1983 Increase in the Federal Cigarette Excise Tax," 1 *Tax Policy and the Economy* 87-111 (1987) (suggesting oligopolistic pricing). None of them, however, suggest that minimum pricing laws, such as the UCSA, are responsible.

Appendix: Special Minimum Pricing Rules for Gray Market Cigarette Sales

The 2000 Legislature enacted a law that imposes minimum pricing rules on a special class of cigarettes—U.S. brand cigarettes manufactured in a foreign country or manufactured in the United States for sale in a foreign country.[1] This law is not part of the UCSA, although it refers to and requires UCSA minimum prices to apply. Moreover, it was enacted to address a problem that is distinctly different than that addressed by the UCSA—i.e., efforts by cigarette wholesalers to avoid the manufacturers' price increases used to fund the settlement agreements with the states. Because of the similarities to the UCSA, this appendix briefly describes the problem the law was designed to address and the provisions of the 2000 law.

The Problem

The origins of the minimum price law lie in the price increases imposed by cigarette manufacturers to pay for settlement of the state-filed lawsuits. During the late 1990s, the tobacco companies settled lawsuits filed by state governments over the companies' liability for medical and related costs paid by the states that were caused by smoking. In order to pay for these settlements, cigarette manufacturers imposed a series of substantial price increases. The sum of these price increases, attributable to the settlements, exceeded $1 per pack of 20 cigarettes.

U.S. manufacturers make and sell their U.S. brand cigarettes in foreign markets. Some of these cigarettes are manufactured in the United States and exported; others are manufactured in foreign countries by subsidiaries of the companies or licensees of the U.S. companies. When the manufacturers increased their domestic prices to pay for the state lawsuits, they did not similarly increase their prices in foreign markets. Their reasons for not doing so seem obvious. The foreign competitors of U.S. manufacturers would not have increased their prices, since they were not paying U.S. damage or settlement awards. If the U.S. companies had raised their prices in international markets (essentially spreading the cost of U.S. settlements across all their markets), their cigarettes would not be price competitive with foreign brands. Their local competitors in international markets would have had a significant price advantage.[2] The net result is a two-tier price structure for U.S. brand cigarettes: one price for the domestic or U.S. market and another (significantly lower) for international markets.[3]

[1] 2000 Laws, ch. 496, § 2, subd. 1(c), to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 325D.421, subd. 1(c).

[2] In some cases, licensing agreements (with companies that manufacture and market their products in foreign countries) may have prevented them from doing so. This matters little; even if they could have done so legally, it would not have been a sensible business or marketing decision.

[3] Manufacturers also contend that the U.S. brands manufactured for sale in foreign countries have different formulations and, as a result, are different products (e.g., have different tastes and so forth). It is unclear to what extent this is actually distinguishes the products and would affect consumers' willingness to buy them.

This situation created an opportunity for brokers or wholesalers to buy U.S. brand cigarettes that were intended for sale in foreign counties at the lower prices. The brokers would then resell them in the United States. This would defeat the manufacturers' efforts to maintain their two-tier price structures and to pass the full cost of the legal settlements onto U.S. smokers. The initial efforts focused on cigarettes manufactured in the United States for export. The brokers purchased this product (ideally) before it actually left the United States. This minimized transportation costs and any problems of freshness in the cigarettes. These U.S. brand cigarettes manufactured in the United States for export came to be called "gray market" cigarettes, referring to the fact that they had been manufactured for sale outside the United States. A change in federal law prohibited this practice[4] and the brokers turned to foreign manufactured cigarettes.

To stem the problem of gray market cigarettes, manufacturers contractually prohibited wholesalers from buying cigarettes directly from the manufacturer if they also purchased these gray market cigarettes. This prevented the large mainline wholesalers from selling these gray market cigarettes.

The practice also had the potential to affect payments under the settlement agreements. Under Minnesota's settlement, the payments from the tobacco companies were pegged to domestic sales (not Minnesota sales, but national sales). The multi-state settlement agreement is similar. As a result, sales of cigarettes manufactured for sale in foreign countries (whether manufactured in the United States or a foreign country) would not be counted in determining the companies' obligations under the settlements. Since the Minnesota market is a very small share of the total domestic market, gray market cigarettes sold in Minnesota were unlikely to have much of an effect on payments to Minnesota. However, manufacturers (who sought to maintain their two-tiered price structure) and wholesalers (who were prohibited by contracts with manufacturers from participating in the gray market) sought a legislative resolution of this issue

Description of the Law

To address this situation, Laws 2000, chapter 496, imposes special minimum pricing rules for cigarettes that:

- Were first sold in the Minnesota market after January 1, 1998;[5] and
- Have trademarks, trade dress, and trade names that are confusingly similar to cigarettes that were sold in the Minnesota market before January 1, 1998.

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[4] 26 U.S.C. § 5754(a).

[5] The approach of tying the minimum pricing rules to cigarettes marketed after January 1, 1998 was adopted to avoid explicitly and exclusively imposing these special rules on foreign products or products moving in foreign commerce. By the nature of the situation, this law applies only to foreign cigarettes or U.S. cigarettes that were first exported. Under the foreign commerce clause, a law that was restricted to and imposed disadvantageous rules exclusively on a foreign product would likely be unconstitutional. The federal power over foreign commerce is nearly exclusive. *See, e.g.*, *Zschernig v. Miller*, 389 U.S. 429 (1969).

These cigarettes must be sold at minimum prices that apply under the UCSA to the brands of cigarettes that were sold in Minnesota before January 1, 1998. This provision, in effect, requires gray market cigarettes and U.S. brand cigarettes that are manufactured outside of the United States to be priced equivalently to their U.S. counterparts. In effect, it legally mandates the manufacturer's two-tiered pricing structure by requiring UCSA pricing calculations to be made based on the manufacturer's invoice price for *domestic* cigarettes (not gray market or foreign cigarettes).

This law is enforced only by private causes of action for injunctive or other equitable relief or damages. A successful plaintiff may also recover attorney fees. The court may treble actual damages, if it finds the violation is "egregious." For minimum pricing violations, the court may award exemplary damages to a plaintiff equal to the amount charged below the permitted minimum price. Violations are also misdemeanors.